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EMPLOYING AI
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
THOUGHT experiments can be useful not only in exploring new con-cepts but also in bringing interesting perspectives to bear on old
problems.  Developments in “people analytics,” perhaps someday leading
to the dominance of artificial intelligence in selecting and managing em-
ployees, offer an opportunity to do both.  One disturbing conclusion from
such an examination is that current paradigms do not seem to reach even
the explicit use of race, sex, or other “protected classes” as selection crite-
ria when deployed by artificial intelligence.  That has important implica-
tions for current law, entirely apart from actual developments in AI.  In
addition, such an examination sheds new light on how other aspects of
Title VII may apply to the spread of Big Data to the workplace.
* * *
Imagine that, today or in the not-so-distant-future, a company desires
to take full advantage of the developments of artificial intelligence by ef-
fectively delegating all its hiring decisions to a computer.1  It gives the
computer only one instruction: “Pick good employees.” Taking “Big Data”
to the logical extreme, the computer (we’ll call it Arti2) is also provided
with all the employer’s available data.  That includes not merely what
* B.A., Siena College; LL.B, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law and
Senior Associate Dean for Finance & Faculty, Seton Hall Law School.  This article
draws in part from my posting on JOTWELL, Comprehending Causation and Correlation,
Aug. 4, 2017, https://worklaw.jotwell.com/#identifier_0_1087 [https://perma.cc/
4ZYY-RB5P].  It also draws from various thoughts expressed in SULLIVAN & ZIMMER,
CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2017).  I thank Neil Cohen,
Timothy Glynn, Ed Hartnett, Najarian Peters, Jon Romberg, Rebecca Hanner
White, Steve Willborn, and Elana Zeide for indulging my ruminations and
correcting my more egregious errors.  Also, thanks to Charles Mueller, Seton Hall
class of ‘19, who provided able research assistance.
1. While this article imagines a scenario well beyond what current technology
can achieve, “people analytics” is making inroads in the workplace today, and the
trend seems certain to increase. See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) [hereinafter Kim] (documenting
some current efforts to create algorithms for employee selection); see also Jennifer
Alsever, How AI is Changing Your Job Hunt, FORTUNE (May 19, 2017), http://fortune
.com/2017/05/19/ai-changing-jobs-hiring-recruiting/ [https://perma.cc/4WZ2-
SABX].  Unlike the scenario imagined here, however, human beings are heavily
involved in current data mining in the employment arena.  For a more general
critique of the effects of big data on society, see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION
(2015).
2. “Hal” was taken. See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968).
Hal stands for Heuristically programmed ALgorithmic computer.
(395)
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might be termed “human resources” information about its workers (such
as performance evaluations) but also data on all the employer’s operations
because individual performances might be linked to particular successes
and failures of the business.  To cap it off, the company authorizes the
computer to scour the internet to identify other traits of successful and
unsuccessful current and former employees in order to assist its task.3  Al-
though there are obvious privacy concerns with such an exercise,4 my fo-
cus is on implications under the antidiscrimination laws.5
The instruction “pick good employees,” to say the least, provides
hardly any guidance,6 but at the 30,000-foot level is the goal of any em-
ployer.  Our hypothetical firm believes Arti will be competent at its job;
that is, it expects it to select persons who turn out to be good employees,
or at least do better at that task than humans who lack both its processing
power and its data resources and therefore will outperform Arti only by
luck.7
3. It might, in addition, develop data not currently available.  For example,
machines can apparently conduct first-round interviews with applicants in which
the goal is to obtain information about their qualifications not available from a
traditional application or resume. See Simon Chandler, The AI Chatbot Will Hire You
Now, WIRED.COM (Sep. 13, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/the-ai-chatbot-will-
hire-you-now/ [https://perma.cc/3YCL-BLYY]; see also Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam
A. Cherry, Marcia McCormack & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People Analyt-
ics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 973-85 (2017) [hereinafter Bodie] (reporting how
some information is gathered by requiring applicants to play games supposedly
revealing information about their talents and skills).
4. See Bodie, supra note 3, at 985-1007.
5. The two concerns, however, overlap, most prominently with respect to fed-
eral laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2018),
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2018),
which bar employer “inquiries” about medical or genetic conditions in order to
discourage discrimination.  Whether Arti’s mere access to data that could reveal
disabilities or genetic information would violate those statute’s prohibitions on em-
ployer inquiries is another question, the answer to which might depend on
whether Arti sought out new information or contented itself with what the em-
ployer had currently available.  Data gathering could also uncover protected class
membership for applicants, such as sex or race, which might not otherwise be
available.  One example of analytics uncovering such information, albeit in the
consumer context, is Target’s developing customer profiles, which generated in-
formation about likely pregnancy.  Bodie, supra note 3, at 999.  Such information
could obviously be used to discriminate.
6. See Kim, supra note 1, at 875 (suggesting that data analysis begins with a
contestable definition of what constitutes a “good” employee); Solon Barocas &
Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 679 (2016) [here-
inafter Barocas & Selbst] (“[T]he definition of a good employee is not a given.
‘Good’ must be defined in ways that correspond to measurable outcomes: rela-
tively higher sales, shorter production time, or longer tenure, for example.”).  In
Arti’s case, however, that decision as to who counts as a good employee is out-
sourced to it to begin with.
7. Admittedly, the employer might have to provide some further instruction
to the computer regarding the goals of the company: a “good” employee will assist
a firm in achieving its goals, and different goals might require different traits for
good employees.
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To carry out its mission, Arti will need to define what makes an em-
ployee “good,” and might well develop different criteria for different posi-
tions. So a good worker in a physically demanding job might be one who is
physically strong while a good worker in a research lab might have a Ph.D.
in one of the sciences.  However it goes about its task, there are two obvi-
ous constraints on Arti’s ability to define a “good” employee, both stem-
ming from the data it has available.
The first constraint is defects in the data. For example, individual
pieces of information may be incorrect or correct information may be ag-
gregated to yield inaccurate results, as when two individuals with similar
names are treated as the same person.  Alternatively, the data may be accu-
rate as far as it goes but problematic insofar as it incorporates prior dis-
crimination, as when past performance evaluations are tainted by
conscious or unconscious bias.8  The data may also be unrepresentative or
incomplete.  Thus, it may be skewed if members of protected classes are
not adequately represented.  For example, Arti will presumably look to
present or former employees to develop a template for a good worker.
But applicants may be very different from current and former workers in a
variety of ways.  Similarly, the data available for applicants might limit
Arti’s ability to assess them well on relevant axes, and some groups of ap-
plicants may be less well represented than others.9  In either case, garbage
in, garbage out.
But Arti is scarcely unique in this regard since the problem of inaccu-
rate or unrepresentative information plagues human decision-making,
and discrimination law is quite forgiving when humans make hiring and
firing mistakes because of inaccurate information.  For example, Title VII
does not hold an employer liable for discrimination under the disparate
treatment theory when a human relies on inaccurate information to make
8. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6, at 682 (recounting how a system for sorting
medical school applicants carried forward prior discrimination in admissions).
9. To the extent Arti is looking at current or past workers to model good
employees and those workers are not diverse, Arti might perpetuate current hiring
practices rather than pick better workers in some abstract sense. See Bodie, supra
note 3, at 1013 (“It should not be surprising that trying to predict qualities of good
future workers based on the qualities of current workers and existing work culture
will not lead to change.  In other words, people analytics runs the risk of
homosocial reproduction, or replacement of workers with workers that look like
them, on a grand scale.”); see also Alan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big Data”
and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 574 (2016) [herein-
after King & Mrkonich] (“For example, if incumbents are older than applicants,
then the social-media profile of this older group may differ markedly from that of
younger job applicants.  Accordingly, an algorithm highly accurate in sorting in-
cumbents for their proficiency may yield applicants notable only for their ‘retro’
tastes and lifestyles.”); Kim, supra note 1, at 871–72 (“algorithms will not counter-
act structural forms of workplace bias” in terms of the way the workplace is cur-
rently organized; for example, some kinds of work schedules are particularly
difficult for women with childcare responsibilities).
3
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a decision adversely affecting a protected class member.  This is the es-
sence of the “honest belief” rule.10
Second, it’s possible that many traits of good employees are not capa-
ble of being captured by the information Arti has at its disposal—no mat-
ter how voluminous it is.  Further, the more abstract the trait (loyalty,
creativity, dedication), the less well are Arti’s results likely to map onto
some idealized perfect worker.  In other contexts, hard data can dwarf
“soft variables,” even if the latter are in some sense more important,11 and
that may well be true of Arti.
However, that’s not a fatal, maybe not even a serious, objection to an
employer using Arti for this task.  After all, the question is not whether Arti
is perfect but rather whether it is as good as or better than current prac-
tices.  And the antidiscrimination statutes don’t really care whether any
particular selection device actually improves productivity so long as it does
not discriminate.12  Ultimately, it’s not as if we humans have very effective
ways of ascertaining abstract traits, and the premise of people analytics is
that reliance on data will yield better results than traditional methods of
decision-making.  This is particularly true of the hiring process, where de-
cisions have usually been made on the basis of very limited (and often
imperfect) information.  If Arti can identify workers who are likely to be
“good” on one or a few axes, that may be sufficient to justify its use as
compared to traditional selection processes.  And the employer will have
post-hiring opportunities to assess more holistic aspects of employee
performance.
10. See Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006)
(evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason was not factually correct was not
necessarily probative of pretext because “[a] pretext, to repeat, is a deliberate false-
hood.  An honest mistake, however dumb, is not . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also
Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he proper inquiry
is not whether AT&T was factually correct in determining that Johnson had made
the bomb threats. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether AT&T honestly believed
that Johnson had made the bomb threats.”).  But note that perhaps the more egre-
gious the “mistake” the more likely the trier of fact is to find the supposed reason is
a pretext for discrimination. See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, Disparate Treatment
Employment Discrimination and an Employer’s Good Faith: Honest Mistakes, Benign Mo-
tives, and Other Sincerely Held Beliefs, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 45 (2011).
11. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361 (1971); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly
Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
155, 161 (1984) (noting the “pernicious tendency” of cost-benefit analysis to
“dwarf soft variables” in constitutional law).
12. The point is simply that the antidiscrimination laws do not require share-
holder value maximization; that’s a goal that must be reconciled with various legal
requirements, including antidiscrimination laws, which may sometimes tend to re-
duce profits.  The statutes do accommodate productivity concerns by allowing neu-
tral practices with a disparate impact to be justified by business necessity.  See text
beginning infra note 89.
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In any event, there are reasons to expect Arti to do better than
humans by reducing irrationality13 in employee selection, and that in-
cludes performing better than we humans have done in avoiding discrimi-
nation.14  A wide range of research suggests that human bias has
considerable negative consequences.  This research ranges from audit
studies or field experiments showing disparate treatment in real world set-
tings15 to statistical analyses finding that minorities and women get the
13. Even “rational” selection criteria may be problematic from a performance
perspective, and, to the extent that, for example, traditional predictors of success
favor whites, they may result in unjustified unfavorable outcomes for minorities.
Thus, Google discovered that selection based on such “rational” factors as college
attended and grade point average, were not as predictive of success on the job as
other factors—such as cognitive abilities, intellectual humility, and the ability to
learn—that could be assessed by an appropriate process.  Jennifer Alsever, How AI
Is Changing Your Job Hunt, FORTUNE, (May 19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/
05/19/ai-changing-jobs-hiring-recruiting/ [https://perma.cc/4WZ2-SABX]; see
also Josh Constine, Pymetrics Attacks Discrimination in Hiring with AI and Recruiting
Games, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 20, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/20/
perunbiased-hiring/ [https://perma.cc/GE3T-3KG6].
14. See Kim, supra note 1, at 871 (recognizing that data-driven selection may
avoid the problems in the “considerable amounts of bias” inherent in “subjective
assessments, intuition, and limited human cognition,” but arguing that, since “al-
gorithms are not always neutral either . . . the real question is how the biases they
may introduce compare with the human biases they avoid.”); Bodie, supra note 3,
at 1010–11 (“Decisions made by well-meaning people are often flawed by implicit
biases that systematically disadvantage historically disadvantaged groups.  The abil-
ity to analyze accurately what employee traits and skills a business needs to thrive is
immensely valuable.  And the ability to do that in a way that considers a person’s
skills accurately without revealing aspects of a person’s identity that could trigger
bias, whether explicit or implicit, is even more valuable, not just to the business but
to the equality project and society more broadly.”); see also Robert Bolton, Artificial
Intelligence: Could an Algorithm Rid Us of Unconscious Bias?, PERSONNEL TODAY (Nov.
16, 2017) https://www.personneltoday.com/hr/artificial-intelligence-algorithm-
rid-us-unconscious-bias/ [https://perma.cc/4J3E-4J4Z].
15. In these studies, researchers try to directly test the operation of bias by
having matched pairs of real or simulated applicants—each pair as similar as possi-
ble except for the variable of interest (race or sex)—apply for real-world positions.
If one group is more successful than the other, there is reason both to believe that
bias exists and that it affects actual decision-making.  A significant study in the
employment context sent otherwise identical resumes to employers; those using
names that did not “sound” African American received more favorable treatment.
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 991, 991–92 (2004); see also David Neumark, Roy J. Bank & Kyle D. Van
Nort, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, 111 Q.J. ECON. 915,
917-18 (1996).  An earlier instance was a study by the Urban Institute that sent
matched pairs of black and white testers into the job market, with African Ameri-
cans faring substantially worse. MARGERY A. TURNER, MICHAEL FIX & RAYMOND J.
STRUYK, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINA-
TION IN HIRING 37–66 (1991). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 55–58 (1992).  In the legal
context, a recent study showed that law firm partners rated work product as worse
when the same submission was thought to be written by an African American attor-
ney rather than a Caucasian one. See Arin N. Reeves, Written in Black & White:
Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills, NEXTIONS (2014),
5
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short end of the stick across many contexts.16  To those showings can be
added tests of implicit bias that suggest that discriminatory “attitudes” are
pervasive.17  While there are serious questions about the extent to which
such tendencies meaningfully influence actual decision-making,18 the risk
http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-
yellow-paper-series.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVC6-3NMF].
16. Statistical analyses use retrospective data to seek to hold constant a large
number of variables in order to determine whether racial or other bias exists.  A
dramatic example (albeit not in the employment context) is research showing that
the NBA referees were more likely to call fouls on players of a different race than
themselves. See Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA
Referees, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1859, 1859–60 (2010) (finding statistically significant evi-
dence of own-race bias among NBA referees).  More attuned to the employment
setting, another study found that store managers were more likely to hire members
of their own race than members of another race.  Laura Giuliano, David Levine &
Jonathan Leonard, Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27 J. LAB. ECON. 589
(2009).
17. Although there are a host of studies bearing on cognitive bias, the social
science research that has perhaps received the most attention is the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test, which purports to measure attitudes at variance with the subjects’
expressed views.  Hosted at Harvard and available on the Internet, Project Implicit
is open to anyone with an Internet connection. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://im-
plicit.harvard.edu/implicit [https://perma.cc/5GVT-HSKW] (2011).  It measures
biases (or “implicit attitudes”) by comparing how quickly a test taker equates posi-
tive and negative words with images of members of different races (and other cate-
gories of interest).  These results are then compared with the subject’s self-
reported views on race.  The IAT has generated a substantial social science litera-
ture analyzing the results of literally hundreds of thousands of visits.
The IAT has been the subject of harsh criticism in the legal academy.  The
critics have argued that measuring attitudes by millisecond responses to stimuli is
inherently flawed and that, even if the test does in some sense identify such atti-
tudes, there is little evidence that they in fact affect real-world decision-making. See
Amy L. Wax, Supply Side or Discrimination? Assessing the Role of Unconscious Bias, 83
TEMP. L. REV. 877, 883–902 (2011); Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MC-
GEORGE L. REV. 687, 687 (2009); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do
Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737, 738 (2009); Amy L. Wax, The
Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 984–85 (2008); Greg-
ory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1023 (2006).  But the IAT has also garnered substantial
support. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 482 (2007); see also Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1063 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV.
997 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
18. Recent scholars have both questioned the extent to which implicit bias, at
least as measured by the IAT, influences real world decisions.  They have also ques-
tioned whether the very concept has inappropriately shifted attention from more
conscious forms of discrimination. See Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias
and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 190, 194 (2018) (“[L]abeling
nearly all contemporary discrimination as implicit and unconscious is likely to
place that behavior beyond legal reach.  And it turns out that most of what is de-
fined as implicit bias could just as easily be defined as explicit or conscious bias.”);
see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure, BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LABOR L.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=301
5031) [https://perma.cc/8BTQ-QVZK] (“And the repeated invocation of the con-
6
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of implicit bias and the other studies documenting the extent of discrimi-
natory outcomes might well make Arti seem the safer choice than current
reliance on humans.19
So we can start out with some optimism about using Arti to select
good workers.  Implementing its task, Arti could be expected to devise a
mechanism that incorporates many factors, familiarly known as an al-
gorithm.  That term connotes a multifactored, sophisticated mathematical
operation, and that might well be the end result of Arti’s operations.  But
Arti could also devise a far simpler selection device, and its choice between
a single criterion and a more complicated algorithm would presumably
depend on the data available and Arti’s ability to correlate that data with
some (or many) measures of productivity.
We will not, of course, know what criteria Arti will choose until we let
it operate, but let’s explore a few possibilities and examine how the law
might react to its actions.  Indeed, were this real life, and the employer’s
General Counsel got wind of Arti’s assignment, she might be well advised
in light of recent software-related scandals to explore the legal risks en-
tailed.20  The results of such an analysis may be more than a little
surprising.
cept of implicit bias by political progressives suggests that old-fashioned intentional
discrimination is a thing of the past, when in fact it may simply be better hidden.
Indeed, at a moment in history when overt racism—seen in the reaction among
some to the election of a black president, and in a significant part of the move-
ment that elected Donald Trump—once again seems a major factor in our public
life, the suggestion that implicit bias is the central problem may be particularly
misleading.”); Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Uncon-
scious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1058
(2009) (arguing that the disparity between IAT results and expressed egalitarian
attitudes is equally consistent with unconscious bias and conscious but concealed
bias).
19. This might be reinforced by programming Arti to entirely exclude certain
factors (prohibited characteristics under the antidiscrimination laws) so that the
new-and-improved Arti is literally color- and gender-blind.  However, such pro-
gramming would not necessarily be effective. See text beginning infra note 77.
Technological efforts short of Arti have been suggested as means of reducing
bias. See Nancy Leong, The Race-Neutral Workplace of the Future, 51 U. CAL. DAVIS L.
REV. 719 (2017) (describing various efforts to mask gender during the interview
process). But see Katharine Zaleskijan, Job Interviews Without Gender, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/opinion/sunday/job-interview-
without-gender.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading
&m [https://perma.cc/HM6M-2Z6B] (arguing that masking for interviews does
not address the real problem of workplaces that are not hospitable to women). See
also EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 2013) (ques-
tioning the current “color blind” paradigm).
20. The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal is the poster child for firms hav-
ing some controls over software processes.  Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The
Law of the Test: Performance-Based Regulation and Diesel Emissions Control, 34 YALE J.
REG. 33 (2017).
7
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II. ARTI GOING ROGUE
First, consider the most extreme possibility that (shades of Hal!) Arti
might go rogue.  In other words, suppose Arti decides that a prohibited
trait under the antidiscrimination laws is a valid predictor of being a good
employee.  Despite our societal commitment to equality, this is not far-
fetched.  Scholars have long recognized “statistical discrimination,”21 the
possibility that employers discriminate not out of any animus but because
the protected group in question is (or is perceived to be) less productive
(or more expensive) than other workers.  For example, an employer may
be acting rationally (if illegally) in not hiring disabled workers,22 older
workers,23 women of child-bearing age,24  or those disposed to genetic dis-
eases25 because of perceived greater costs due to potential accommoda-
tions, health insurance premiums or shorter job tenure.  The claim isn’t
that such decisions are necessarily correct: the perception that certain
workers are more expensive and/or have less job attachment may not be
21. See, e.g., Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination:
Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 818–19 (1985) (“The statistical theory of
discrimination is based on an assumption of market imperfection.  This model as-
sumes that employers lack sufficient information to evaluate at a reasonably low
cost the productivity potentials of workers.  Employers, therefore, substitute readily
available proxies such as race, sex, education, or experience for precise, but costly,
productivity information. . . .  Under the statistical model, employer discrimination
reflects not tastes . . . but rather perceptions of reality.  That is, racial discrimina-
tion reflects employer expectations of the comparative productivity of black and
white workers.  Under certain conditions, the statistical model of discrimination
may explain the persistence of discrimination even in an otherwise perfectly com-
petitive environment.”); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622–23
(1991); see also Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 228 (1986); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033169) [https://
perma.cc/8UUS-EZY4] (exploring philosophical and legal implications of statisti-
cal discrimination).
22. See Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 777, 793 (2017); see also King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 581–83.
23. See Berhanu Alemayehu & Kenneth Warner, The Lifetime Distribution of
Health Care Costs, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 627 (2004) (health care costs increase with
age).  In an attempt to deal with one aspect of this risk, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act permits employers to provide lower benefits for older workers so
long as they incur equal costs for such benefits.  Thus, where a “bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan” is involved, an employer will not violate the statute if it either
(1) provides its workers equal benefits (in which case there is no discrimination)
or (2) provides age-differentiated benefits but incurs equal costs in doing so.  29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (2018).
24. See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out
Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1333 (2017) (“[T]he work patterns of the 90% of women
who are mothers will frequently diverge from those of men and childless women,
leading one expert to observe that ‘[o]ur economy is divided into mothers and
others.’”).
25. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
75 (2016).
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true, and, even if it is, such workers may have countervailing advantages.26
Nevertheless, suppose Arti concluded the contrary when working with a
particular set of data, and excluded women of childbearing age.
If a human decision maker drew that gender line, we would label it
disparate treatment discrimination and strike it down absent some statu-
tory defense.  Indeed, the Supreme Court did exactly that in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp. with respect to an employer’s policy excluding wo-
men with pre-school age children.27  Absent a statutory defense,28 it has
not mattered whether the group in question is in fact different in job re-
lated ways.29  Rather, the individual focus of Title VII bars employers from
treating applicants and employees as if they share the traits of the pro-
tected class to which they belong.  For this reason, antidiscrimination law
forbids reliance on prohibited grounds, even if that reliance is statistically
rational.30
But the policy in Martin Marietta was promulgated by humans.  Sup-
pose, instead, it is Arti that draws such a line.  Shockingly it (or, more
accurately, the employer who deploys it) does not seem to have violated
the law as the Supreme Court has declared it: put simply, Arti has not
engaged in either disparate treatment or disparate impact as those terms
have been defined by the Court, which has repeatedly described these two
theories as if they comprise the entire universe of “discrimination.”31
26. Indeed, Arti might be the solution instead of the problem.  As we’ve seen,
one advantage of nonhuman selection processes is filtering out human biases. Arti
might “know” that many stereotypes that influence current decision-making are
not true and therefore its selection of employees should be more fact-based and
less driven by biases.  If we let the Artis of the world proceed without regulation, it
would be an empirical question whether the cause of equality would, overall, be
advanced or retarded.
27. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (finding the lower court erred in reading
§ 703(a) “as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men—each
having pre-school-age children”).  The Court, however, remanded for considera-
tion of a possible bona fide occupational qualification defense.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (2018) (Title VII); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2018) (ADEA).  It did not mat-
ter to the Court that the policy at issue in Martin Marietta did not discriminate
against all women, just those with pre-school age children, which has generally
been described as a “sex-plus” theory. See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the
Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1371–72 (2017) [hereinafter Zatz].
28. The following discussion ignores the possibility that a particular act of
discrimination may be permitted under one of the exceptions to the antidis-
crimination statutes, such as the bfoq.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII); 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(1) (ADEA).
29. See discussion in text beginning infra note 70.
30. In this regard, however, Arti might be the solution instead of the prob-
lem.  As we’ve seen, one advantage of nonhuman selection processes is filtering
out human biases.  Arti might “know” that many stereotypes that influence current
decision-making are not true and therefore its selection of employees should be
more fact-based and less driven by biases.  If we let the Artis of the world proceed
without regulation, it would be an empirical question whether the cause of equality
would be advanced or retarded.
31. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
See discussion in text beginning infra notes 34 and 55.
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A. Disparate Treatment and the Limits of “Intent”
Most obviously, Arti isn’t human, so it can’t “intend” to discrimi-
nate,32 and Supreme Court precedent requires “intent” or “motive” (the
terms are often used interchangeably33) for what it labels “disparate treat-
I put to one side a third theory, nonaccommodation, which is largely confined
to the Americans with Disabilities Act, see § 12112(b)(5) (defining discrimination
to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”), al-
though it has limited resonance in Title VII with respect to religion, EEOC v. Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015), and, arguably, pregnancy,
Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); see also id. at 1356–57 (Alito, J., concurring)
(while under the first clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act “all that matters
is the employer’s actual intent,” the second clause “adds a further requirement of
equal treatment irrespective of intent.”).
Some view harassment as yet a fourth theory of discrimination, Katherine M.
Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 691–92 (1997),
but that doctrine fits more-or-less well into traditional disparate treatment since it
requires the perpetrator to be motivated by the protected trait of the victim, On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII does not
prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex.’  We have never held that workplace harass-
ment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations.”).
32. Concerns have been raised about using Big Data in employee selection in
terms of discrimination being intentionally programmed in by those designing the
algorithms.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6, at 692–94.  While such concerns are
legitimate where humans are involved, the conceit of this article is that the artifi-
cial intelligence is making all decisions free of human intervention—beyond pro-
viding it with the instruction to choose good employees and providing it with all
available data that might bear on that task. Human bias is, by hypothesis, excluded
from consideration.
33. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert
Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 914–16 (2005).
In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011), the Court made a conscious
effort to distinguish “motive” from “intent,” with both required for employer liabil-
ity: the relevant agent must possess a discriminatory motive and must also have
intended the conduct to cause plaintiff to suffer an adverse employment action;
further, that agent must have proximately caused the resulting adverse action.  It is
not clear whether all agents with both motive and intent can trigger liability for the
employer.  562 U.S. at 422 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer
would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discrimina-
tory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.”). See generally Charles
A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012).
However, the Court soon reverted to its former use of the terms as synony-
mous. E.g., Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1356 (2015) (“Claims of discrimination
under [the first clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act] require proof of dis-
criminatory intent.  Thus, as a result of the first clause, an employer engages in
unlawful discrimination under §2000e-2(a)(1) if (and only if) the employer’s in-
tent is to discriminate because of or on the basis of pregnancy.  If an employer
treats a pregnant woman unfavorably for any other reason, the employer is not
guilty of an unlawful employment practice under §2000e-2(a), as defined by the
first clause of the PDA.  And under this first clause, it does not matter whether the
10
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ment” cases.  In its seminal decision in Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
the Court bifurcated the universe of Title VII violations into disparate
treatment and disparate impact,34 and it described disparate treatment as
“the most easily understood type of discrimination.  The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although
it can in most situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.”35  Courts have repeatedly quoted the “proof of discriminatory
motive is critical” language,36 and there are literally thousands of cases
that speak of “discriminatory intent” as the sine qua non of a disparate
treatment violation.37  Further, the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments rein-
force this focus to the extent they added “motivating factor” liability to the
statute.38  Finally, some Supreme Court Justices have recently stressed the
necessity of a wrongful motive for a Title VII disparate treatment
violation.39
Arti doesn’t have any “motives,”40 which seems to mean that its using
a prohibited criterion to select good employees can’t be said to violate
Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition.41  In one sense that is hardly
employer’s ground for the unfavorable treatment is reasonable; all that matters is
the employer’s actual intent.”) (citations omitted); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358-59 (2013) (“It would be inconsistent with the structure
and operation of Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on
an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or
retaliatory intent.”).
34. See discussion in text beginning at note 54.
35. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).  The Court went on to write: “Undoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it en-
acted Title VII.” Id.
36. E.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 250 (2005); Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
37. A Lexis Search yielded 6067 hits (“discriminatory intent” w/p “Title VII”),
conducted Dec. 4, 2017.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  The division between disparate treatment
“motivating factor” liability and disparate treatment liability assessed under McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is complex but beyond the scope of
this article. See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 925–38.
39. See infra note 50.
40. See Bodie, supra note 3, at 1025–26 (“[A] necessary implication of Barocas
and Selbst’s discussion is that disparate treatment may be impossible to prove be-
cause machines are not sentient—they cannot have motives.  Decisions can be at-
tributed to algorithms developed over time by the analytics process itself rather
than by human design.  This kind of discrimination sounds more like disparate
impact.”)
41. The antidiscrimination laws are directed at “employers” (as well as em-
ployment agencies and labor organizations), which are typically business entities
rather than natural persons.  Speaking of the motives of an artificial intelligence
might not look so odd when we routinely describe artificial entities as having “in-
tent” (as in the ubiquitous phrase “legislative intent”).  But in the antidiscrimina-
tion arena, the cases to date have addressed that question by looking to the
11
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surprising: legal rules first formulated more than forty years ago don’t
map very well onto Arti’s actions.  Admittedly, there is an obvious
workaround: anthropomorphizing Arti, which would impute to the em-
ployer both the prohibited motivation and intent to cause an adverse em-
ployment action when Arti classifies on prohibited grounds.42  That would
“solve” the precedent problem43 but only by creating a legal fiction,44 one
designed to adapt traditional doctrine to the brave new world of Arti.45
However, it would also raise questions of whether “intent” could not more
generally be divorced from traditional views of human motivation, and it
would generate a real conundrum as to the correct analysis at the obvious
next stage.  That is, suppose that, to avoid this problem, Arti is program-
med not to use protected traits in its operations.  While it would then be
race- and gender-blind, faithfulness to its mission would seem to require it
motives of human beings within the entity, see Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411
(2011), discussed supra note 33.
42. Employers are responsible for the discriminatory acts of their decision
makers, and, as Staub suggests, even for discriminatory acts by lower-tier supervi-
sors whose bias is intended to and does proximately cause adverse employment
actions.  They may or may not also be responsible when decisions result from the
bias of co-workers. Id. at 422 n.4.  And they may be directly responsible when they
fail to deal appropriately with discrimination by co-workers or even third parties.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (setting out the liability
structure for harassment by supervisors and others).  In all these cases, however,
there is some human being manifesting the requisite discriminatory motive.
43. However, to hold the employer liable for the actions of Arti would seem to
require some modification to the law of agency which, at least for some legal pur-
poses, views a computer program not an “agent” to begin with.  The Restatement
of Agency provides that a computer program is not capable of acting as a principal
or an agent as defined by the common law.  At present, computer programs are
instrumentalities of the persons who use them.  If a program malfunctions, even in
ways unanticipated by its designer or user, the legal consequences for the person
who uses it are no different than the consequences stemming from the malfunc-
tion of any other type of instrumentality.  That a program may malfunction does
not create capacity to act as a principal or an agent.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also id. illus. 3 (dog acting as instru-
mentality for its owner may create liability for owner). But see Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, UNIF. Law Comm’n 1999, adopted in multiple states, which pro-
vides that “electronic agents” may bind those who use them.  While this may make
sense in, say, electronic contracting, it would exonerate the employer of disparate
treatment liability since neither the human nor her instrumentality would have the
necessary discriminatory motive, even if the human had been negligent in its pro-
gramming Arti.
44. There are those, Professor Willborn among them, who view “motive” as
developed in the courts as mostly a legal fiction to begin with, that is, as a label
placed on a set of facts post hoc when we see certain results.  That may be a better
description of the reality of discrimination law, but is certainly not how the courts
view the enterprise.
45. One could describe this as a nondelegable duty not to discriminate, but
deploying such a device immediately runs into a conceptual problem.  At least
when disparate treatment is concerned, there is no discrimination absent a human
with the requisite intent.  Thus, any employer duty not to discriminate is satisfied.
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to look to “neutral” criteria but ones with a high correlation to the now-
off-limits prohibited characteristics.46
However, there’s a more direct and more textual way to reach the
same result without treating Arti as human, although that requires aban-
doning the Court’s bifurcated structure and returning to the text of the
statute.  The governing language of Title VII (and other antidiscrimina-
tion laws47) clearly proscribes Arti’s use of gender as a selection criterion,
and does so entirely without the need for either of the two theories articu-
lated by the Court over the years.  The core prohibition of Title VII is
§ 703, whose two subsections have been viewed as the basis, respectively, of
disparate treatment and disparate impact liability.48  But, entirely apart
from the judicial gloss of each subsection, the language of the statute
would declare Arti’s gender-explicit criterion a violation under both
prongs.  Section 703 declares it an unlawful employment practice
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
46. Were a human to resort to this device, we would likely describe it as pre-
text.  But, absent treating Arti as human, current structures seem to require such
action to be analyzed as disparate impact. See discussion beginning infra note 77.
47. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (ADEA).
48. Subsection (a) is often said to focus on disparate treatment while, because
of its “tend to deprive” language, subsection (b) is frequently cited as the basis for
disparate impact liability in the statute as it was passed in 1964.  However, subsec-
tion (b) would clearly include classifications motivated by a prohibited considera-
tion that actually deprived a class member of employment opportunities. See
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991)
(“Section 703(a) . . . prohibits sex-based classifications in terms and conditions of
employment, in hiring and discharging decisions, and in other employment deci-
sions that adversely affect an employee’s status.  Respondent’s fetal-protection pol-
icy explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of their sex.  The policy
excludes women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs and so creates
a facial classification based on gender.”); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (finding the lower court erred in reading § 703(a) “as
permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men—each having pre-
school-age children”; the opinion quoted both subsections); Cf. Sandra F. Sperino,
Justice Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789 (2016) (arguing that subsection
(b) is applicable to disparate treatment claims but attributing that largely to Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). See generally Rebecca Han-
ner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1150 (1998) (“This does
not mean that Section 703(a)(2) cannot also support a disparate treatment claim
when an employer intentionally limits, classifies, or segregates its employees for a
prohibited purpose.  It does mean that when Section 703(a)(2) is relied upon as
the basis for a claim, adversity must be shown.”).
13
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versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.49
In our thought experiment, Arti would be discriminating against wo-
men by failing or refusing to hire them under subsection (1)50 and also
classifying them in a way that would deprive them of employment opportu-
nities under subsection (2).51
In short, a court ready to strike down Arti’s facial gender exclusion
rule could ground its reasoning on the language of § 703(a) rather than
the decisional law which, to date, has, quite naturally, involved human
motivations.  But such action would cry out for a theoretical justification,
with the most obvious being that Title VII embraces a causal view of what
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
50. The argument to the contrary can be found in the dissents in Texas Depart-
ment of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015), which seem to read the “because of” language of both subsections to
require discriminatory intent to be the causal agent.  For example, Justice Thomas
wrote:
Each paragraph in § 2000e-2(a) is limited to actions taken “because of” a
protected trait, and “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason
of’ or ‘on account of.’”  Section 2000e-2(a) thus applies only when a pro-
tected characteristic “was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.”
In other words, “to take action against an individual because of” a pro-
tected trait “plainly requires discriminatory intent.”
No one disputes that understanding of § 2000e-2(a)(1).  We have repeat-
edly explained that a plaintiff bringing an action under this provision
“must establish ‘that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’
for taking a job-related action.”  The only dispute is whether the same
language—“because of”—means something different in § 2000e-2(a)(2)
than it does in § 2000e-2(a)(1).
The answer to that question should be obvious.  We ordinarily presume
that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning.”
Id. at 2526–27 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 2535 (Al-
ito, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia) (“Like the FHA,
many other federal statutes use the phrase ‘because of’ to signify what that phrase
means in ordinary speech.  For instance, the federal hate crime statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 249, authorizes enhanced sentences for defendants convicted of committing cer-
tain crimes ‘because of’ race, color, religion, or other listed characteristics.  Hate
crimes require bad intent—indeed, that is the whole point of these laws.  All of this
confirms that ‘because of’ in the FHA should be read to mean what it says.”) (cita-
tions omitted).  Of course, the dissenters in Inclusive Communities were not faced
with Arti, but it is not impossible to imagine them finding the “plain meaning” of
“because” in Title VII to exclude nonhuman discrimination, leaving it to Congress
to address the gap in coverage thereby created.
51. Kim, supra note 1, at 911–12 argues that this subsection would permit
attack on what she calls “classification bias,” without the need for invoking tradi-
tional disparate impact theory.  While Congress obviously did not have data min-
ing in mind in 1964, the language of § 703(a)(2) “sweeps broadly enough to reach
unanticipated employer practices that exacerbate or entrench inequality on pro-
hibited bases.”  She offers a new approach that departs from conventional dispa-
rate impact theory in a number of ways. Id. at 917.
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we call disparate treatment rather than a motivational one,52 although mo-
tivation provides one (but only one) causal mechanism.
That, in turn could have enormous implications for more quotidian
cases.  Most obviously, the debate about whether discrimination requires
conscious motivation or whether an actionable decision can flow from un-
conscious impulses, usually referred to as “implicit bias,” would seem to be
resolved were a court to find the employer guilty of a violation when Arti
employs explicit gender sorting in its hiring decisions.  A violation would
simply be a matter of causation although proof that a particular adverse
employment action was caused by such biases would remain difficult.  An-
other possible implication is revisiting the notion that discrimination on
the basis of traits highly correlated with a prohibited characteristic but not
coextensive is not actionable.53  Might a sufficiently high correlation be
viewed as causal?  Further, those who feel a need to root Title VII’s pro-
52. I am by no means the first to see causation as the key to Title VII viola-
tions.  Efforts to explain how implicit bias could fit within an intent-centric view of
disparate treatment necessarily required a turn to causation. See, e.g., Linda Hamil-
ton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1995) (“It would be
reasonable to interpret [§ 703’s] language as simply requiring proof of causation
without proof of intent.  In other words, a Title VII claimant would need only
establish that his or her protected status ‘made a difference’ or ‘played a role’ in a
challenged employment decision.  This is not, however, how section 703 has been
construed.”). Accord Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40
CONN. L. REV. 979, 982-83 (2008); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Inten-
tions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95
VA. L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2009); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The
Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 294 (1997).  More recently, Pro-
fessor Zatz argued that “status causation” underlies all the theories of discrimina-
tion, including non-accommodation, but operates with different causal
mechanisms for each.  Zatz, supra note 27.
53. Trait discrimination has manifested itself in a number of contexts, includ-
ing national origin (often with the trait being language and race and sex. See gener-
ally Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 893 (2014)
(modern sex discrimination targets men and women who do not conform to work-
place norms); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An
Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006) (employers should
not be allowed to use invalid trait proxies at all and to use valid ones only if there is
no disparate impact); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimina-
tion: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 167 (2004) (trait discrimi-
nation should be actionable sex discrimination “only when it stems from gender
norms and scripts that are themselves incompatible with sex equality in the work-
place”); Tristin Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands, Social
Equality, and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 386 (2008) (“[E]mployees
should be provided space to signal membership in groups protected by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act through employer accommodation of appearance.”); D.
Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do
With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1393 (2008) (courts should expand the defini-
tion of race to include historical and contemporary understandings); Camille Gear
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of
Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1239 (2004) (downplaying the risk that courts will
recognize employees’ race or ethnicity performance only when it “comports with
stereotypical negative representations of minority communities”).
15
Sullivan: Employing AI
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
410 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 395
scriptions in some flaw of the employer might justify the result in terms of
the employer’s negligence (or even recklessness) in allowing Arti to pro-
ceed in its merry way without the kind of programming that would have
prevented its using a protected trait as a selection criterion.  That despite
the general resistance to viewing Title VII as being even in part negligence
based.54
B. Disparate Impact to the Rescue?
Perhaps the question of the legality of Arti’s operations under the
disparate treatment theory could be avoided entirely: suppose we assume
that the requisite human intent is lacking for a violation under that analy-
sis but look to disparate impact to solve the problem of Arti’s explicit gen-
der exclusion.  Unfortunately, as suggested at the outset, Rogue Arti also
fails to meet the requirements of the latter theory, thus falling into the gap
created by the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of discrimination into dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact. Teamsters, having required intent for
disparate treatment claims, went on to distinguish disparate impact claims
as “involv[ing] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.  Proof of dis-
criminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory.”55
In short, while Arti’s hypothetical rule excluding women of childbear-
ing age would obviously fall more heavily on women than men since wo-
men would be the only ones excluded, that rule is scarcely “facially
neutral”; rather, it is facially discriminatory precisely because it classifies
on a prohibited ground.56
The more highly correlated, the more likely a court will view discrimination
on the basis of that trait as being the same as discrimination on the protected basis
with which it is correlated.  But Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993),
distinguishing between age discrimination and discrimination to avoid pension
vesting, indicates that courts draw distinctions even between highly correlated fac-
tors. See also EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.
2016) (Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of immutable charac-
teristics, not traits culturally associated with race, such as dreadlocks).
54. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 936–44 (1993); Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1055 (2017); see also Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A
Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
67, 89–90 (2010) (exploring the normative question of whether the statute should
be read to impose liability on those not consciously motivated to discriminate).
55. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(emphasis added).
56. In discussing this paper with the author, Professor Romberg argued that
the Court couldn’t have meant to permit facially discriminatory classifications that
fell outside of the disparate treatment/disparate impact bifurcation.  While he pre-
fers expanding disparate treatment to reach Rogue Arti, he argues that, as a
fallback, disparate impact should be read to include any selection criterion with
the requisite impact, even if they are facially discriminatory.  In this, he can look
for support to the codification of disparate impact by the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
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This may require some explanation since a gender disqualification
buried in computer code might be thought not to be “facial” to begin
with.  However, “facial” has been used to embrace not just overt policies of
discrimination but covert ones so long as they classify workers on prohib-
ited grounds.57  The fact that an investigator would have to decipher com-
puter code to find the discrimination is no more relevant than the need to
decipher more traditional code words to find they express a prohibited
preference.58  In both cases, there is an express (but covert) policy at work
to exclude on the prohibited grounds.59
There is yet another reason why disparate impact will not resolve the
problem of Rogue Arti: as hypothesized, the gender exclusion seems to be
justified by business necessity and therefore is not illegal.60  The disparate
impact theory, as traditionally framed, would not seem to invalidate an
employment practice that was based on real differences in, say, productiv-
ity between the races or genders (although if it was the result of inten-
tional discrimination it would be illegal disparate treatment).  One widely
accepted formulation of business necessity is found in the Third Circuit’s
decision in El v. SEPTA,61 which summarized the standard as requiring an
employer relying on the defense to “show that a discriminatory hiring pol-
icy accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an applicant’s ability to per-
form successfully the job in question.  In addition, Title VII allows the
employer to hire the applicant most likely to perform the job successfully
over others less likely to do so.”62  Again, the notion of “rational discrimi-
nation” suggests that some acts of discrimination will satisfy normal stan-
dards of business necessity.
which does not explicitly require facial neutrality. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-(k).  The argu-
ment, however, is just another way of saying that the current bifurcated paradigm
does, not account for Arti, which is the point of this article.
57. The most obvious example is Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618, 634, (2007), abrogated by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, codified,
inter alia, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A), which treated as a “facially discrimina-
tory pay structure” one whose discrimination between blacks and whites was re-
vealed only through multiple regression analysis.  Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385
(1986).
58. There are currently lawsuits pending challenging alleged employer racial
and ethnic preferences for certain kinds of workers from staffing firms.  Among
the allegations are code words said to reflect those preferences. See Kelly Heyboer,
No ‘Ghetto People’: How Temp Agencies Allegedly Hire Based on Race and Gender, NJ.COM
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2016/09/no_ghetto_people
_how_temp_agencies_allegedly_hire.html [https://perma.cc/72NT-U9SN].
59. Arti’s work might be less obvious and less easy to establish in litigation,
being hidden in a proprietary algorithm; but intentional discrimination is also fre-
quently kept under wraps for obvious reasons.
60. This requires an important caveat: even when an employer establishes the
business necessity for a policy, the plaintiff may nevertheless establish liability by
showing an “alternative employment practice.”  § 703(k)(1)(A) & (C); see Jones v.
City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016). See discussion infra at note 131.
61. 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 242.
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To see this, consider International Union v. Johnson Controls,63 where at
issue was an employer’s “fetal protection policy,” which excluded women
deemed capable of child-bearing from positions in which they would be
exposed to elevated levels of lead.  The en banc Seventh Circuit majority64
had viewed this as a disparate impact case, in large part because of the
greater flexibility allowed by the business necessity defense than would be
true were the bfoq to apply.65  Not surprisingly given that move, it then
found the policy justified by business necessity.66  The Supreme Court was,
therefore, faced with the question whether business reasons could validate
an express gender exclusion under disparate impact’s business necessity
defense.  It, however, avoided the question by viewing the policy as a spe-
cies of disparate treatment, finding intent to discriminate even absent ani-
mus since “the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.”67
That analysis meant that the only defense possible was the narrower bona
fide occupational qualification exception, not the broader business neces-
sity justification, and the Court held the policy not to be a bfoq.68
63. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
64. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).  The court had splintered with some judges
applying business necessity and others bfoq.  The majority, however, upheld the
policy as a business necessity although it would also have found the bfoq defense
established.
65. Int’l Union, UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886-87 (7th
Cir. 1989) (“We are convinced that the components of the business necessity de-
fense the courts of appeals and the EEOC have utilized in fetal protection cases
balance the interests of the employer, the employee and the unborn child in a
manner consistent with Title VII.  The requirement of a substantial health risk to
the unborn child effectively distinguishes between the legitimate risk of harm to
health and safety which Title VII permits employers to consider and the ‘[m]yths
or purely habitual assumptions’ that employers sometimes attempt to impermissi-
bly utilize to support the exclusion of women from employment opportunities.
Likewise, the requirement that the risk of harm to offspring be substantially con-
fined to female employees means that a fetal protection policy applying only to
women recognizes the basic physical fact of human reproduction, that only women
are capable of bearing children.  Finally, the employee’s option of presenting less
discriminatory alternatives to a fetal protection policy assures that these policies
are only as restrictive as necessary to prevent the serious risk of harm to the un-
born child.”).  Other courts had also approved the use of the business necessity
defense for such policies. E.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982)
(remanding for consideration of that defense).
66. The Seventh Circuit’s decision was rendered during the brief period after
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and before the effective date
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act during which the business necessity defense had been
watered down and employees had the burden of persuasion that business necessity
was not applicable. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past
the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 960-64 (2005).
67. 499 U.S. at 188.
68. The Johnson Controls holding was codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which added § 703(k)(2) to Title VII: “A demonstration that an employment prac-
tice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim
of intentional discrimination under this title.”
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While Johnson Controls was clear that the policy at issue was subject to
disparate treatment (together with its narrower bfoq defense) not dispa-
rate impact analysis (and its broader business necessity defense), it was
equally clear that the facial discrimination there reflected the intent neces-
sary for a disparate treatment violation.  A similar analysis could be under-
taken with respect to City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart the quintessential rational discrimination case.  There the Court
found disparate treatment in a policy of requiring women to contribute
more to their pensions than similarly situated men because women, as a
class, lived longer than men, as a class, and therefore required more con-
tributions to ensure equal monthly benefits on retirement.69
With no statutory defense available, the policy was held illegal.  But
suppose the case is viewed from a disparate impact lens.  It certainly seems
plausible that the employer could establish a business necessity for requir-
ing additional funding for employees who impose additional costs.
The more-than-a-little surprising conclusion is that, under normal
analysis, neither the disparate treatment nor impact theories seem to bar
Arti’s explicit gender exclusion.  Since it’s clear that we shouldn’t permit
such practices, there’s something wrong with an analytic framework that
leads to such counterintuitive results.  As we saw with disparate treatment,
there is a way to avoid this conclusion, but, again, the alternative would
reject the Court’s bifurcation of discrimination into disparate treatment
and disparate impact.  This time, perhaps a more obvious theory is on
offer, one that draws from Phillips v. Martin Marietta as well as both Johnson
Controls and Manhart.  That theory would make facial discrimination im-
permissible regardless of motive and regardless of the requirements of the
impact.70
However, a ban on “facial discrimination” is entirely consistent with
conventional disparate treatment theory since in all three cases (maybe in
69. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).  The employer required larger contributions for
pension funding from women than for men because the longer life expectancy of
females meant greater actuarially-projected benefit payments.  The Court treated
this difference as factually true:
This case does not, however, involve a fictional difference between men
and women.  It involves a generalization that the parties accept as unques-
tionably true: Women, as a class, do live longer than men.  The Depart-
ment treated its women employees differently from its men employees
because the two classes are in fact different.  Id. at 707–08.
Nevertheless, the policy discriminated against women in violation of Title VII be-
cause “all individuals in the respective classes do not share the characteristic that
differentiates the average class representatives,” id. at 708, and Title VII requires an
individual focus. Manhart is conventionally viewed as a variety of disparate treat-
ment discrimination, See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (2017) (leading off Chapter 2, Systemic Disparate Treatment),
where the requisite intent is obvious from the classification, albeit animus did not
underlie the policy.
70. This seems to be what Barocas & Selbst mean when they write “Disparate
treatment recognizes liability for both explicit formal classification and intentional
discrimination.”  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6, at 694.
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all cases where the explicit classification is not drawn by a nonhuman such
as Arti71), the prohibited intent results in the facial distinction.  And that
seems to be the correct reading of the cases.  While neither Martin Marietta
nor Manhart casts much light on the question since neither mentions ei-
ther motive or intent, Johnson Controls clearly viewed facial discrimination
as simply a variety of disparate treatment.  At one point, it wrote, “The bias
in Johnson Controls’ policy is obvious,”72 and, in a more extended passage
was even clearer:
[T]he absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory
effect.  Whether an employment practice involves disparate treat-
ment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on
why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms
of the discrimination.  In Martin Marietta, . . . the motives under-
lying the employers’ express exclusion of women did not alter
the intentionally discriminatory character of the policy.  Nor did the
arguably benign motives lead to consideration of a business ne-
cessity defense.  The beneficence of an employer’s purpose does
not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based pol-
icy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and thus may be de-
fended only as a bfoq.73
The thrust of this passage is that intent to discriminate (i.e., to draw a
gender line) is critical but that that animus is not necessary: it is enough
that the actor’s intended to distinguish between workers on a prohibited
ground regardless of whether the impetus was benign or malignant.74
71. Until the advent of Arti, the possibility of facial discrimination that was
not wrongly motivated was limited to somewhat bizarre hypotheticals.  For exam-
ple, suppose an employer believed a certain organization’s members caused
problems in the workplace, perhaps because of beliefs regarding white supremacy,
and banned members of that organization without knowing that it was a religion.
See Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1015 (E.D. Wis.
2002).
72. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991).
73. 499 U.S. at 199-200 (emphasis added).  Whether this is consistent with
equal protection principles is another question. See Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) (“A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary
when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classifica-
tion.”) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
74. Given the absence of any discriminatory motive, there could be no claim
of systemic disparate treatment, which, like its individual disparate treatment
cousin, requires intent to discriminate although in systemic cases the intent is typi-
cally inferred from statistical outcomes that seem unlikely to have occurred unless
selection processes were driven by prohibited motives. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States.
431 U.S. 324 (1977). See generally Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the
Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387 (2011);
Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 395 (2011); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 455 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment
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In short, to invalidate Rogue Arti’s gender exclusion by treating it as a
facial classification achieves the goal of not permitting artificial intelli-
gence to adopt employment practices that would be illegal if deployed by
humans, but it does require some tinkering with precedent.  If we’re will-
ing to do that, the simplest approach would be to replace the current
treatment/impact bifurcation but not with a facial discrimination epicycle;
rather, as suggested, the Court could simply adopt a pure causation struc-
ture.  Indeed, given the statutory language, situating a “facial-discrimina-
tion” rule in Title VII’s text would ultimately have to be in the “because of”
language and given that, there’s no obvious reason to extend “because of”
beyond intent but only to facial discrimination and no further.
To this point, then, the normative takeaway from our thought experi-
ment is that current views of disparate treatment liability reflect a cramped
version of what Title VII is most naturally read to prohibit.  Motive/intent
are one, but only one, causal path that employers can tread.75
III. BEYOND ROGUE ARTI
Beyond the borders of our thought experiment, Rogue Arti is unlikely
to pose a serious problem.  Employers, acting to limit risk or merely to do
the right thing, are not likely to let Arti go about its work with no safe-
guards.  Thus, while it may be literally impossible (given Arti’s mission and
the data it has access to) to prevent it from “knowing” the race, sex, age,
and even disability status of the individuals with whom it deals,76 it can be
programmed to avoid directly using those criteria in its operations.
Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011).  As applied
to Arti’s actions, a systemic disparate treatment case might appear from a compari-
son of the employer’s inputs and output, but any inference of underlying discrimi-
natory intent would be rebutted by the employer’s pointing to Arti as the cause.
75. Causation is also operative in the disparate impact context, although the
law focuses only on the employer’s contribution to what is a causal setting that
leads to the disproportionate underrepresentation of minorities and women in the
workforce.  Ramona Paetzold & Steven Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A
View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 353–355 (1996) (“Ordi-
nary disparate impact cases, then, view causation with blinders.  The law treats the
employer’s criterion as the cause of a disparity, even though it may be only one of
a wide array of factors necessary to produce the disparity.  Ordinary disparate im-
pact cases view causation with blinders, not because the cases arise in a single-cause
context, but because they ignore causes external to the employer that contribute
to the impact.  The blinders necessarily mean that employers may be held legally
responsible for impacts that are “‘caused’ in substantial part by factors external to
the employers.”). See also Zatz, supra note 27, at 1358 (“A disparate impact claim’s
statistical comparison of group outcomes provides evidence that individuals have
suffered status causation.  Group outcomes are constructed by aggregating individ-
ual outcomes.  Disparities between group outcomes can emerge only if many indi-
vidual group members suffer harm because of their protected status (status
causation).  But not all group members suffer this injury; it is spread unevenly
within the group.  The statistical evidence demonstrates that some individuals suf-
fered discrimination’s injury, but it does not identify which individuals.”).
76. I use “knowing” in the sense that the data is available to Arti even if it is
instructed not to use it.  That essentially maps onto the current world where em-
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As has been suggested, that decision would essentially shift the focus
of the antidiscrimination laws from disparate treatment, with its single-
minded concern for motive, to disparate impact, in which biased motives
are irrelevant.  Suppose Arti plays it straight (either left to its own devices
or as a result of prophylactic programming prohibiting reliance on pro-
tected characteristics) and does not use such characteristics as part of its
selection process.  In still pursuing good employees, the most likely scena-
rio is that Arti will use proxies for the forbidden traits (second-best crite-
ria) to achieve results that approximate what it would have done had not
sex been ruled out-of-bounds.77  If a human were to undertake this exer-
cise, we might well talk of “masking” her true motive,78 but we’ve seen that
Arti has no motive; it seeks only to find the best workers within the limits
of its data and the constraints of its programming.  Thus, if it uses a crite-
rion to identify those likely to be good workers, it is simply following the
data.
To see this, imagine that, after looking at all the data, Arti concludes
that the only criterion that it could measure effectively in terms of per-
formance is job tenure.  Given the costs of employee turnover,79 that
might be a valuable contribution even if criteria more closely connected to
actual job performance would theoretically be preferable.  After all, objec-
tive measures on an individual basis may not exist in the data set, and Arti
may determine that supervisor evaluations are not reliable and/or aren’t
predicted by the data available at hiring.
ployers usually know protected characteristics even though they are not generally
supposed to take them into account.
77. If Arti would perceive gender as a useful sorting criterion, but is prohib-
ited from using gender per se, it will turn to “gender neutral” factors that approxi-
mate the result that it would have reached when gender per se was on the table.
Like the Target example, it might find purchasing decisions that correlate with
pregnancy.  Or it might exclude people who took extended leaves from work, a
criterion that would presumably exclude many women of childbearing age.  As
Professor Kim notes in Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 166, 193 (2017) [hereinafter Auditing Algorithms], “[i]n any sufficiently
rich dataset, proxy variables likely exist that closely correlate with [protected] char-
acteristics, permitting implicit sorting on these bases.”
It is for this reason that some commentators view calls for transparency algo-
rithms to be an inadequate solution to problems posed by such use. See Joshua A.
Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV, 633, 633–34 (2016) (challeng-
ing the “dominant position” that transparency will solve” such problems both be-
cause it is often impracticable and sometimes undesirable and technological
innovations allow the design of “decisionmaking algorithms that . . . better align
with legal and policy objectives”); cf. Kim, Auditing Algorithms, supra note 77, at 197
(arguing in favor of retaining audits of outcomes to detect  discrimination).
78. Bodie, supra note 3, at 1014.  Use as an example of masking bias the use of
zip codes to screen out minority candidates.
79. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Infor-
mation Exchange under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 89 n.137 (2016) (re-
porting studies reflecting that replacement costs—direct and indirect—can exceed
the cost of an employee’s annual salary, sometimes by multiples of it).
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In any event, suppose job tenure is Arti’s criterion for good workers.80
Presumably, Arti would then81 canvass its data to determine what factor or
factors predict82 longer length of services.  For example, Arti might dis-
cover that workers who live closer to the workplace were likely to stay
longer.  That would mean that “good” is highly correlated with place of
residence at hiring relative to the workplace.  Under this arrangement,
Arti might then hire applicants residing in nearby zip codes and reject
those living further away.83
Of course, this is greatly oversimplified: Arti is almost certain to devise
multiple criteria for good employees and will similarly develop more com-
plicated ways of ascertaining who is most likely to satisfy these criteria.  But
for purposes of our thought experiment, let’s stick to the simplest model:
“good” equals length of employment and length of employment is best
predicted by place of residence at hiring.
Correlation between residence and longevity may be caused by many
things, some of which may conform to our intuitive notions of good work-
ers while others may not.  For example, workers may stick around because
of the short commute rather than any intrinsic loyalty to the company or
love of the work.  Similarly, those with longer commutes may tend to leave
more quickly precisely for that reason.  If Arti is doing its job right, how-
ever, it has identified the only criterion for which the data can predict job
success (as indicated by length of service) and implemented a hiring sys-
tem to maximize that success.84
In this example, Arti’s selections make at least some sense in human
terms; that is, we can see a causal connection between the criterion and
the performance measure selected.  But note that the ability to discover
associations with no obvious causal connection is usually viewed as a fea-
ture,85 not a bug,86 of people analytics, and Arti might well have come up
80. Some might call this a “loyalty” measure, which might make it appear that
Arti is looking for more abstract job traits, but that’s more a label than a criterion
since there are obvious problems with measuring “loyalty” solely by length of
service.
81. “Then” suggests a temporal hierarchy of operations that probably doesn’t
exist since Arti is recursively looking over the data to see what criteria it can assess
while simultaneously specifying the metrics for predicting when a candidate is
likely to be successful.
82. It’s probably more accurate to speak of factors that “correlate” with the
relevant criteria, but the point of the exercise is to select workers who will be good
in the future, so “predict” seems appropriate.
83. There might be a chicken-egg problem here with more committed work-
ers moving closer to their workplace after being employed, but, presumably, Arti
will figure that out.
84. Again, Arti may be wrong, and its hiring algorithm may be a failure.  But,
by hypothesis, Arti has done the best it could with the available data.
85. Bodie, supra note 3, at 969–71 (“Analytics is a term often used in a busi-
ness context to describe the discovery of meaningful patterns in data, also known
as knowledge discovery in data. . . .  Data mining usually does not begin with a
hypothesis, but instead uses a variety of tools to generate hypotheses and test them
against the available data. . . .  Data analytics are popular within the HR community
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with a criterion—say, taste in music—with no intuitive causal connection
to the performance measure it correlates with.87
Disparate impact analysis under Title VII88 generally proceeds in
three steps.89  In the first, plaintiff must identify a “particular employment
practice”90 with an adverse racial impact.91  If plaintiff is successful, defen-
dant then has the opportunity to establish the affirmative defense that the
because they are efficient and effective at using information to find or identify
groups or individuals who have desirable skills, attributes, needs, or tastes.”).
86. The “bug” part may be the time frames for any such correlations.  King &
Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 562, suggest that causal explanations are likely to be
more stable across time than mere correlations.  Thus, they report a firm’s discov-
ery that expert coders also favor a particular Japanese manga site; that correlation
might last only as long as the site in question remains “hot.”  The authors view this
as the Achilles heel of big data in employment: “there is no reason the algorithm
that bests fits the data on Monday will do so on Tuesday. . . . Because there is no
understanding of why the correlation exists, there is no basis for surmising how
long it will persist.” Id. at 578 (emphasis in original).
87. See James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimina-
tion, 7 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2017) [hereinafter Grimmelmann & Westreich].
88. Michael Selmi, in Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701 (2006), argues that disparate impact has never functioned well outside
the context in which it was created—the use of paper-and-pencil test results as
excluders of applicants.  The analysis that follows suggests he may be correct.
89. Age Discrimination in Employment Act cases have a somewhat different
analysis because of the statute’s “reasonable factors other than age” defense. See
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)
(2018).
90. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if—(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in ques-
tion and consistent with business necessity.”).  Subsection (k)(1)(B) allows the
plaintiff to challenge an entire “decision-making process” rather than a particular
practice if it “can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s
decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis.”  Section
701(m) defines “demonstrates” as carrying the burden of production and
persuasion.
The place of residence example assumes that Arti is using a single criterion
with a disparate impact.  In more realistic models, the employer’s algorithm would
use a combination of factors and questions would arise as to which, if any, of those
factors had the requisite impact.  For example, Arti might construct a regression
equation with good job performance as the dependent variable and a variety of
data as the independent variables.  Whether a plaintiff would be required to chal-
lenge the entire algorithm or could focus on particular aspects of it would un-
doubtedly become an issue.  To the extent that factors relied on aren’t separate
pass/fail screens but interrelate with each other, the entire algorithm might seem
the appropriate unit. See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 154–55
(2d Cir. 2012) (while a promotion process formally involved three steps, the first
two steps could not be separated from the rest for statistical analysis since both
played an indeterminate role); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., 519 F.3d 264, 279 (5th
Cir. 2008) (no error in analyzing several employment practices as one where the
seniority system and the treatment of absenteeism were subject to considerable
managerial discretion).
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practice is justified by business necessity and job relation.92  Finally, if de-
fendant is successful in carrying its burden, the plaintiff may nevertheless
prevail by showing that the employer refused to adopt an “alternative em-
ployment practice” that would equivalently meet its needs with lesser ad-
verse impact.93
With respect to the first step, if a plaintiff proves that Arti looks to job
tenure as a measure for good employees and residence proximity to the
workplace was the predictor (the “particular employment practice”), an
adverse racial impact on African Americans would often exist given hous-
ing segregation patterns, depending on the location of the workplace and
the demographics of the surrounding areas.94
On the other hand, the data is presumably available to determine if each inde-
pendent variable has a disparate impact (i.e., the selection process is capable of
being separated for analysis), and a plaintiff might well prefer to attack them sepa-
rately; after all, while they may well predict job performance when their values are
combined, each considered separately may not be job-related.  However, Arti
hasn’t used the factors separately but as part of its single selection process, so per-
haps the algorithm can’t “be separated for analysis” in that sense.  And there has
always been a tension with regard to what constitutes the relevant unit for impact
analysis.  Traditionally, each “test” has been so viewed, although each question on
the test could be examined.  In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-26 (1977),
the Court considered height and weight requirements as a single selection crite-
rion although they could have been separately analyzed.  And to add a final com-
plication, an employer is not required to prove the defense for any component of a
selection process that it can show does not have the requisite impact,
§ 703(k)(1)(B)(ii) (if the employer “demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the [employer] shall not be required
to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.”); this creates
the possibility that the employer might sometimes want to deconstruct its own
algorithm.
In any event, the extent to which an algorithm can be deconstructed in litiga-
tion is sure to be a focus of concern, and these determinations may be influenced
by trade secret considerations.  Although Arti is imagined to be owned by the em-
ployer, real world employers are likely to use third-party software, whose owners
are likely to resist disclosure of the algorithms used. See EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 694
F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2012). See generally King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 557–58.
91. When an identified practice will be found to have such an impact can also
raise issues. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Sorelle Friedler, Carlos Scheidegger & Suresh
Venkatasubramanian, Hiring by Algorithm: Predicting and Preventing Disparate Impact,
SSRN pp. 11–13 [listed as a not-to-be-cited draft] (discussing, inter alia, applying
the EEOC’s four-fifths rule to data mining).
92. § 703(k)(1)(A).
93. § 703(k)(1)(A) (“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if . . . the complaining party [demon-
strates the availability of] . . . an alternative employment practice and the respon-
dent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.” See infra note 131.
94. See Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 800 (3d
Cir. 1991).  Professor Kim reports an instance in which a company elected not to
use distance from work as a predictor of job tenure as part of its hiring algorithm
precisely “because it understood that housing patterns are correlated with race and
that relying on that correlation might result in discrimination.”  Kim, supra note 1,
at 873.
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Although in some cases the correlation may be so high that one might
question whether it’s really the prohibited trait that is driving the bus,95
we’ve seen that with Arti there can be no finding of prohibited motive or
intent.  That leaves the question of whether Arti’s criterion is justified by
business necessity.  And, we’ve noted that, in the people analytics context,
such an impact seems, at first blush, justifiable under traditional analysis.
That point is pursued at more length here.
As Barocas and Selbst write, “the very point of data mining is to pro-
vide a rational basis upon which to distinguish between individuals and to
reliably confer to the individual the qualities possessed by those who seem
statistically similar.”96  In other words, data mining seeks to discover statis-
tically significant correlations between the “target variables” (the sought-
after characteristics of better workers) and the traits of potential workers
to the extent they can be found in the data.  And, assuming that the target
variable is itself job-related (say, job tenure in our example), the algorithm
will identify traits that correlate with that variable—even though there may
be no causal explanation available for why that might be true.  Thus, these
commentators conclude that traditional validation techniques are likely to
be satisfied: “Data mining will likely only be used if it is actually predictive
of something, so the business necessity defense solely comes down to
whether the trait sought is important enough to job performance to justify
its use in any context.”97
There are two main critiques of this approach, one more conceptual
and one more technical but both taking aim at the idea that correlation is
sufficient to validate a criterion.  The more conceptual article is by Grim-
melmann & Westreich, who argue that blind correlations should not be
accepted as validating the criteria used.98  They propose that defendant be
95. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly had to deal with the
question of whether legislative redistricting decisions are race-motivated (unconsti-
tutional absent a compelling state interest) or politically-motivated (constitutional
at the moment). See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).  The Supreme Court, although granting certiorari, avoided deciding the
question of whether some political gerrymanders on standing grounds. Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).  In any event, given that African-Americans vote
very heavily Democratic there is a very strong correlation between the political and
the racial possibilities. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473 (2017) (“Getting
to the bottom of a dispute like this one poses special challenges for a trial court.
In the more usual case alleging a racial gerrymander—where no one has raised a
partisanship defense—the court can make real headway by exploring the chal-
lenged district’s conformity to traditional districting principles, such as compact-
ness and respect for county lines. . . . But such evidence loses much of its value
when the State asserts partisanship as a defense, because a bizarre shape—as of the
new District 12—can arise from a “political motivation” as well as a racial one.  And
crucially, political and racial reasons are capable of yielding similar oddities in a
district’s boundaries.  That is because, of course, ‘racial identification is highly cor-
related with political affiliation.’”) (citations omitted).
96. Supra note 6, at 677.
97. Id. at 709.
98. See Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 87.
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required to supplement its statistical proof of validation by providing a
causal explanation for the result.99  That is, the defendant’s business ne-
cessity burden “requires it to show not just that its model’s scores are not
just correlated with job performance but explain it.”100  The authors end
with a cri de coeur: “Applicants who are judged and found wanting de-
serve a better explanation than, ‘The computer said so.’  Sometimes com-
puters say so for the wrong reasons—and it is employers’ duty to ensure
that they do not.”101
The more technical critique is found in King & Mrkonich, who be-
lieve that satisfying defendant’s burden of establishing job relatedness may
be Big Data’s greatest challenge.  Some of Big Data’s most vocal advocates
contend Big Data is valuable precisely because it crunches data that are
ubiquitous and not directly job-related . . . .  The employer’s reliance on
the algorithm may be job-related, but the algorithm itself is measuring and
tracking behavior that has no direct relationship to job performance.  Its
value derives solely from a correlation between this [the identified] behav-
ior and job performance.  The legal question is whether an employer can
meet its burden of proving job-relatedness with evidence that is strictly
correlational.102
In the job tenure example, it is certainly arguable that longevity is a
poor measure of what makes someone a good employee so that Arti’s sin-
gle-minded (so to speak) focus on predictors of that criterion is problem-
atic and perhaps challengeable on that ground.
Indeed, King & Mrkonich suggest looking to the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures103 as a basis for assessing a system of
people analytics.104  The Guidelines trace back to the early days of Title
99. Id. at 170.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 177.  Professor Willborn suggests that this may be misguided since
society often uses predictors whose relationship to the target variable is not very
direct.  He argues that the LSAT for law school admissions is a good example of a
test that is a good predictor of first year law school performance, but see Alexia
Brunet Marks & Scott A. Moss, What Predicts Law Student Success? A Longitudinal
Study Correlating Law Student Applicant Data and Law School Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 205, 208 (2016) (the “LSAT predicts more weakly, and UGPA more
powerfully, than commonly assumed”), although it doesn’t map directly onto law
school studies or examination norms.  Grimmelmann et al. might respond that the
LSAC, which creates and administers the LSAC, has a well-developed rationale for
what it tests, a rationale rooted in skills presumably needed for successful law
study.  Law School Admission Test (LSAT): About the LSAT, LSAC (last visited
Apr. 5, 2018) https://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-the-lsat [https://perma.cc/
WDS6-WTYX].
102. King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 571 (emphasis added); see also Kim,
supra note 1 (“If a statistical correlation were sufficient to satisfy the notion of job-
relatedness, the standard would be a tautology rather than a meaningful legal
test.”).
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2018).
104. King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 571.
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VII and, although they may not have the force of law,105 they have repeat-
edly been viewed as authoritative by courts deciding employment discrimi-
nation decisions.106  While they have been used mainly for the validation
of traditional paper-and-pencil tests with a disparate impact,107 the Guide-
lines broadly apply to any “selection procedure.”108  That means that they
should in theory be applied to Arti’s criterion.  Indeed, just as I’ve argued
that there is no good reason to treat Arti differently from a human when it
uses explicit race or gender classifications, there is no good reason to treat
its use of a neutral criterion differently than if human agency devised the
same selection criterion.
105. The original EEOC Guidelines were viewed as “entitled to great defer-
ence” by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971), a point confirmed
by Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430–31 (1975), which noted that the
“[g]uidelines draw upon and make reference to professional standards of test vali-
dation established by the American Psychological Association.”  While “not admin-
istrative regulations promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the
Congress . . . they do constitute ‘[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency,’ and consequently they are ‘entitled to great deference’.”
(quoting Griggs).
The original EEOC Guidelines were revised and replaced in 1978 by the cur-
rent Uniform Guidelines, representing the collective view of the EEOC and a num-
ber of other federal agencies (including the Department of Labor, the Civil
Service Commission and Department of Justice), have been treated similarly. E.g.,
Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]hirty-
five years of using these Guidelines makes them the primary yardstick by which we
measure defendants’ attempt to validate” a test). But see Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Affirmation of Affirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
903, 910 (1993) (arguing for even greater deference because some of the partici-
pating agencies had “substantive rulemaking authority,” the Guidelines “were
adopted after notice and comment procedures,” and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc. now gives more weight to agency statements
which are adopted through rulemaking.).
106. The Guidelines have been cited in more than 300 cases, including a
number of Supreme Court decisions.  Lexis Advance search, conducted Dec. 10,
2017.
107. See generally Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters
Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 216
(2011).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A)(2018) (“The use of any selection procedure which
has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or other employment or member-
ship opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered
to be discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure
has been validated in accordance with these guidelines. . . .”).  “Selection proce-
dure” is in turn defined broadly to include “[a]ny measure, combination of mea-
sures, or procedure used as a basis for any employment decision,” and includes
“the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil tests,
performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods and physical, edu-
cational, and work experience requirements through informal or casual interviews
and unscored application forms.”  29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (2018).  This suggests
that Professor Kim is incorrect in viewing the Guidelines as “simply irrelevant” to
people analytics, supra note 1, at 999, although she is surely correct that they were
not developed with an eye to this kind of selection device.
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The Guidelines recognize three kinds of validation: criterion, con-
tent, and construct.109  All three require evidence of a sufficient relation-
ship between the selection device and the job performance it is designed
to predict:
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a
criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or sig-
nificantly correlated with important elements of job perform-
ance.  Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection
procedure by a content validity study should consist of data show-
ing that the content of the selection procedure is representative
of important aspects of performance on the job for which the
candidates are to be evaluated.  Evidence of the validity of a test
or other selection procedure through a construct validity study
should consist of data showing that the procedure measures the
degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics
which have been determined to be important in successful per-
formance in the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated.110
With respect to the content111 and construct112 techniques, validation
requires an employer to conduct a “job analysis,”113 as a prelude to con-
structing a test, an exercise that seems largely irrelevant to Arti’s opera-
109. See generally RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS
OF DISCRIMINATION, §§ 5.13–5.17 (2d ed. 2017–2018).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5B (cross-references omitted).
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(D) (“Demonstrated by data showing that the con-
tent of a selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance
on the job.”)  Although “content validation” may seem to imply that the test in
question is valid because it consists of samples of the job in question, the Guide-
lines require only that the employer demonstrate “data showing that the content
of a selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on
the job.”  29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(D).  Many tests have been found content-valid even
though they do not, literally, consist of doing tasks required on the job. See Ass’n
of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 183 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (the
California teaching credential exam was content valid because the skills the test
addressed were necessary for teachers, even though there was no showing that the
test was in any way a sample of the job of teaching).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(E) (“Demonstrated by data showing that the selec-
tion procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable charac-
teristics which have been determined to be important for successful job
performance.”)
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15(B), defined as a “detailed statement of work behav-
iors and other information relevant to the job.”  24 C.F.R. § 1607.16(K).  Arti’s
method of proceeding will not qualify under traditional notions of that concept.
See King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 577 (“Big Data begins from the opposite
perspective—it searches first for correlations.  The algorithm is uninterested in
what any employee actually does, so long as the employer can identify who does it
well and who does it poorly.”).
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tions.114  Indeed, it is worth stressing that “content validation,” which is
the most common variety of test validation in the workplace, requires
showing that the content of the selection device “is representative of impor-
tant aspects of performance on the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated.”115  That could scarcely be possible without a job analysis.  Simi-
larly, it would not be possible to successfully establish construct validity
without first determining the characteristics “important in successful per-
formance in the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.”
While job tenure might be viewed as one aspect of “job performance,”
it seems unlikely that it is the only criterion relevant to that question,
much less than it is “representative” of “important aspects” of perform-
ance.  As we’ve noted, it’s easy to list a number of qualities of a good
worker, with longevity being pretty far down on most lists.  In short, both
content and construct validation seem to be off the table.
But Arti never claimed that job tenure was the theoretically best mea-
sure of a good employee; it claimed merely that it was the only criterion
that, from the data available, could be used to predict success on the
job.116  Were Arti to manifest itself outside of this thought experiment, of
course, it would likely fashion a more complex algorithm, one that took
into account a wider variety of factors.  Nevertheless, the point remains
that Arti’s output is the best of all possible worlds, at least given the data
available and the limits of its processing power.
According to both Grimmelmann et al. and King et al., that is precisely
the problem.  Data analytics characteristically looks to factors that corre-
late with (and hence are thought to predict) the desired criterion even
though they are not necessarily ones for which a convincing explanation
can be offered.  Some supporters of analytics celebrate this: “Professor
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Data Editor at The Econo-
114. The Guidelines focus on predicting job performance, but one might ask
whether “business necessity” might be met by a policy that has little to do with job
performance, as by identifying cost savings entailed by not hiring workers with
certain characteristics (at most correlated with but not explicitly linked to pro-
tected classes).  The Guidelines have little to say about that, and they were devel-
oped at a time when “business necessity” and “job performance” were treated as
synonymous.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“The Act pros-
cribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.  If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).  The 1991 Civil Rights Act’s codifi-
cation of disparate impact uses both terms, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (requir-
ing the employer to “demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” suggesting they
may be separate concepts, but it uses them conjunctively, which suggest both are
required. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1996).
115. § 1607.5(B) (emphasis added).
116. Speaking of Arti making claims means that I am treating Arti as more
and more human as this piece goes on.  Maybe anthropomorphism is inevitable in
the artificial intelligence space.
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss3/2
2018] EMPLOYING AI 425
mist, declare, ‘Causality won’t be discarded, but it is being knocked off its
pedestal as the primary fountain of meaning.  Big data turbocharges non-
causal analyses, often replacing causal investigations.’”117  In other words,
correlation is not causation, but who cares?  The value of Big Data is that it
can discover correlations that are hidden from human perception and,
indeed, perhaps beyond human explanation.  The literature, for example,
suggests that taste for a particular manga site might be a good predictor of
job success for coders.118  Indeed, the place-of-residence criterion may be
one whose relationship to longer job tenure is actually more intuitive than
any number of correlations that analytics might discover and deploy.
A doctrinal answer to this debate would seem to lie in the Uniform
Guidelines’ approach to the third validation strategy, criterion validation.
While this technique has so far been largely ignored in the antidiscrimina-
tion sphere because of its expense,119 people analytics might require revi-
siting it.  As we’ve seen, the Guidelines define criterion-related validity as a
demonstration “by empirical data showing that the selection procedure is
predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior,”120 which would seem to include Arti’s operations.  While “im-
portant elements” might suggest the need for a job analysis, the Guide-
lines explicitly exempt criterion validation from that requirement.121
However, the Guidelines also anticipate that criteria validation will be used
only when the criterion in question is plainly job-relevant: “Certain criteria
may be used without a full job analysis if the user can show the importance
of the criteria to the particular employment context.  These criteria in-
clude but are not limited to production rate, error rate, tardiness, absen-
teeism, and length of service.”122
Adherence to the Guidelines might, for example, justify Arti’s use of
place of residence (to the extent that it correlates with “length of service”)
even if it did not justify use of criteria that do not meet Grimmelmann &
Westreich’s demand for a rational explanation (rather than a mere statisti-
cal correlation).  It seems, however, unlikely that Arti’s correlation itself
“shows” the importance of the criteria, and that no further demonstration
need be made to satisfy them.  In this, the Guidelines seem to track Grim-
melmann’s demand for a rational explanation.
117. King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 555.
118. Id. at 559.
119. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Comm’n, 630 F.2d 79, 92 (2d Cir.
1980) (“Content validation is generally feasible while construct validation is fre-
quently impossible” because it requires “a criterion-related study, . . . a demonstra-
tion from empirical data that the test successfully predicts job performance.”); see
also RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINA-
TION § 4.13 (2016).
120. § 1607.16(F).
121. §§ 1607.14(A) & (B)(3).
122. § 1607.14(B)(3).
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Yet another aspect of the Guidelines may also bear on the question.
Arti will employ its criteria only when they are statistically significant,123
but statistical significance means at most that the correlation is sufficiently
unlikely to be the result of chance.124  While such a showing will undoubt-
edly be necessary for a job-relation defense, there is also the issue of
whether the employer will be required to show “practical significance,”
which focuses on the magnitude of the correlation.125  While the cases to
date have focused mostly on whether the plaintiff must establish both sta-
tistical and practical significance for her initial showing of disparate im-
pact,126 some decisions require the defendant to not only establish that
the correlation is statistically significant but also that it is large enough in
magnitude to justify its use.
Correlation coefficients are measured from +1 to -1, and it seems
likely that extremely low coefficients, even though positive, will be unac-
ceptable.127  These are, however, precisely the kinds of correlations likely
to be detected (at statistically significant levels) by Big Data.  Unless Arti is
programmed to avoid using coefficients below a certain point, its al-
gorithm will likely use factors that no industrial psychologist would find
acceptable for test validation.  Indeed, it is somewhat more complicated
than this: it may be that the entire algorithm produces results with both
statistical and practical significance although factors incorporated in the
algorithm, viewed individually, do not have practical significance.  This
123. The level of significance can be important here.  Traditionally, employ-
ment testing cases have used the .05 level. § 1607.14(B)(5).
124. See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DIS-
CRIMINATION, §§ 4.13, 5.12 (2017-18 ed.).
125. See Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 818 n.15 (5th Cir.
1980).
126. For example, in Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014), plain-
tiffs challenged the police department’s use of hair samples to test for illegal drug
use.  While 98 percent of blacks passed the test, 99 percent of whites did so.  De-
spite the argument that the difference was not large enough to be cognizable, the
First Circuit held this proof sufficient: the data was statistically significant, and
there is no requirement that plaintiffs must also prove “practical significance,” i.e.,
that the size of the disparity is large enough to matter. See also Stagi v. Amtrak, 391
F. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2010) (a showing of “statistical significance” regarding the
sex impact of the challenged rule sufficient to avoid summary judgment even ab-
sent a finding of “practical significance”). But see Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d
1184 (10th Cir. 2012) (statistical significance not sufficient to avoid summary judg-
ment in light of practical insignificance). See generally Kevin Tobia, Note, Disparate
Statistics, 126 YALE L.J. 2382 (2017).
127. The Uniform Guidelines do not directly address practical significance
with regard to test validation. Cf. § 1607.4(D)(discussing both statistical and prac-
tical significance in proving a prima facie case of disparate impact), but courts
nevertheless have viewed practical significance as a requirement. E.g., Hamer v.
City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1525–26 (11th Cir. 1989) (for a test to be criterion-
related, the employer must establish both practical significance and statistical sig-
nificance, with the former being the degree to which test scores relate to job per-
formance). See also Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 472 F. Supp. 1304, 1348 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (“a low coefficient, even though statistically significant, may indicate a
low practical utility.”).
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takes us back to the question of whether the algorithm should be viewed as
a single selection device or broken into its component parts.128
In any event, whether these kinds of questions are a correct exegesis
of the Guidelines is another question, but perhaps not the critical one.
Just as Teamsters did not anticipate Arti, neither did either the Guidelines
or the courts reviewing traditional selection devices.  More to the point,
courts have not previously been confronted with the argument that, how-
ever deficient a particular criterion seems to be, it can be empirically
shown to be the best tool available.  Further, as we’ve seen, the Guidelines
are not governing “law,” which means that they cannot be counted on to
trump the deployment of artificial intelligence in the employment arena.
Despite the “great deference” mantra accorded the Uniform Guidelines,
the Court has repeatedly refused to give “great deference” (or even any
meaningful deference) to other EEOC regulations under Title VII,129 and
one might predict with reasonable confidence that the Uniform Guide-
lines will not be assumed to govern a situation that they never envisioned,
such as Arti.130  In short, it may well be that the use of people analytics will
open a whole new chapter of antidiscrimination law, requiring a fresh as-
sessment of the meaning of validity in the disparate impact context.
For the sake of completeness, the final prong of disparate impact
analysis should be at least mentioned although it seems unlikely to have
any more traction here than in other contexts.  Even if Arti’s employer
128. See supra note 90.
129. E.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013) (“We reject the
nebulous definition of a ‘supervisor’ advocated in the EEOC Guidance and sub-
stantially adopted by several courts of appeals.”); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360-61 (2013) (denying “Skidmore deference” to the EEOC’s
regulation providing that “motivating-factor” analysis applied to Title VII retalia-
tion cases).  Court deference to the EEOC should be greater under the Americans
with Disabilities Act since Title I conferred substantive rule-making authority on
the EEOC in § 12116.
130. Barocas & Selbst argue that Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), im-
plicitly rejected the Guidelines. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano:
End of the Line or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
411 (2010).  Although they recognize that Ricci did not directly address the issue,
they argue that the Court’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, despite
the failure of the employer to find the at-issue test valid, established that test valida-
tion is unnecessary.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 6, at 671.  They argue, further,
that regulation of data mining to reduce biased models might be barred by Ricci.
Professor Kim disagrees.  Kim, supra note 1, at 930–31 (Barocas and Selbst “argue
that attempts to regulate data mining are problematic because diagnosing the im-
pact of a model requires taking protected class characteristics into account.  [But]
the problem in Ricci was not that the City took action with an awareness of its racial
impact, but that the action entailed adverse employment actions against identifi-
able persons.  Merely being aware of the racial consequences of a selection process
does not constitute disparate treatment.  Similarly, an employer’s efforts to under-
stand the racial consequences of its processes in order to avoid bias does not vio-
late Title VII.”); see also Kim, Auditing Algorithms, supra note 77, at 197 (“nothing in
Ricci prohibits revising an algorithm after discovering it has discriminatory
effects”).
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does establish a business necessity defense, a plaintiff may still hold the
employer liable if she can show both the existence of “an alternative em-
ployment practice” with a lesser impact and that the employer “refuses to
adopt such alternative employment practice.”131  Given that the opera-
tions of Arti are likely to be extraordinarily complex, this poses severe
practical problems for plaintiffs seeking to show that an alternative with
lesser impact would equally meet the employer’s goals.  Indeed, if Arti has
done its task correctly, arguably no such proof would be possible,132 al-
though one could imagine a plaintiff successfully adducing evidence of
employers using different selection criteria with a lesser impact.133  But
that aside, the requirement that the employer “refuses” to adopt such a
practice seems to limit this surrebuttal to situations where a party in litiga-
tion learns enough about the disputed practice to serve something very
much like a demand letter on the employer, which then fails to adopt the
proffered alternative.134  Perhaps needless to say, this surrebuttal has
proved generally unsuccessful to date and is even less likely to be a mean-
ingful check on data mining that passes the business necessity standard.
In short, the current state of disparate impact law leaves the legality if
Arti’s operations unclear.  At most, its use of explicit classifiers on prohib-
ited grounds would be barred under a pure causal analysis, but its achiev-
ing much the same result by relying on factors correlated with but not
formally race or sex may well be permitted.  Avoiding that result might be
achieved by a focus on the technical aspects of Uniform Guidelines valida-
tion, but not only are they a slender legal reed but they are also pro-
foundly unsatisfying from a normative perspective in this context.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arti may have taught us something, both about machine decision-
making and human decision-making. One critical lesson is that the Su-
preme Court’s bifurcation of all of discrimination into two theories, is very
problematic, at least unless the theories are radically revised.
131. § 703(k)(1)(A)(ii).
132. King & Mrkonich, supra note 9, at 579–81.
133. The Supreme Court showed little sympathy for such an approach in Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), where the City of New Haven defended its invali-
dation of a firefighter examination with a disparate impact in part by pointing to
other fire departments that used different selection devices with a lesser impact.
However, it may be that the problem was less the theory than the evidence ad-
duced to support it. Id. at 591 (“[R]espondents refer to statements by Hornick in
his telephone interview with the CSB regarding alternatives to the written exami-
nations [such as ‘assessment centers’].  But Hornick’s brief mention of alternative
testing methods, standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact
that assessment centers were available to the City at the time of the examinations
and that they would have produced less adverse impact.”).
134. This was essentially the strategy in one of the few successful invocations
of the surrebuttal.  Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016).
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First, one may question a structure built on a vision of the human
mind as easily capable of consciously separating out various inputs and
able to avoid those that the law has prohibited.  Reliance on those traits
may be sufficient for liability but should not be necessary.  Instead, the
language of the statute suggests that a victim of Arti’s sex-explicit sorting
can bring suit because she has been denied a job “because of” her sex.
That would mean not only that Arti could violate the statute by adapting
explicit prohibited trait criteria but also, and important in the current
world, that less conscious human motives could be sufficient.
As for disparate impact, the Arti experiment underscores the
problems of deploying traditional analysis to assess a technological break-
through.  Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the invention of dis-
parate impact in Griggs v. Duke Power135 and the potential uses of data
analytics in employee selection.  In Griggs, the Court dealt with the then-
common use of testing by public and private employees, which created an
enormous structural barrier to the advancement of African Americans. It
noted that “[h]istory is filled with examples of men and women who ren-
dered highly effective performance without the conventional badges of
accomplishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees.  Diplomas
and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the common-
sense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.”136  To-
day, we may be on the verge of reconstructing such structural barriers
under the flag of Big Data.
Whether disparate impact theory is well equipped to answer the ques-
tions posed by these new developments remains to be seen.  Is correlation
between some criterion and some measure of job performance enough?
Is an additional showing necessary that the measure is “representative” or
“important”?  As Grimmelmann and Westreich argue, is a plausible causal
explanation required?
Arti, alas, can’t answer these questions.  It’s up to mere humans.
135. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
136. Id. at 433.
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